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Gaza Diversity Challenge: Islamism and politics  
 





Islam’s diversity in the present is a historic legacy of schism and factionalism and a 
challenge to the original spirit of unity as outlined by its founder. Yet in the twenty-first 
century political Islam has been represented as more of a monolith than a spectrum of 
ideas and aspirations.  Rivalry within Islam is problematic as it undermines the 
precedent notion of unity through communal belonging (tawhid and ummah). The 
materialization of new Islamist groups is hence a challenge to those who hold to unitary 
visions. In the Palestinian territory of the Hamas governed Gaza Strip the dominant 
Islamist actor is challenged internally by other Islamist elements. Gaza’s Islamists are 
also influenced by events across their border to the West where post-revolutionary 
Egypt has given rise to a veritable plethora of new Islamist actors vying for political 
space and power within the state. This article outlines the phenomenon of Hamas’s 
Islamist rivals and the consequences in terms of governance and legitimacy. It will focus 
on ideological and violent dispute and the means by which it has been combated by 




Hamas’s Islamist and Islamic rivals are used to grabbing the headlines. Their violent 
attacks on Israel, kidnapping and killing of Westerners2 have alerted many to the 
manifestation of a new phenomenon of salafi and jihadi-salafi Islam in Gaza. The 
leaders of such groups publicly laud al-Qaeda and predict that they are opening a new 
bridgehead in the global jihad in this over-crowded territory which is home to 1.6 million 
Palestinians many of whom are aid dependent. These Palestinians are getting by on 
international handouts because Israel and the West have imposed a siege regime on 
the area in the wake of Hamas’s election victory in January 2006. This has effectively 
closed Israel’s borders to Gaza in terms of a regular flow of goods into and out of the 
Gaza Strip.3 The leaders of the new radical groups live a shadowy life, hiding not only 
from the long arm of Israel’s counter-terrorist units but from Hamas’s formidable security 
and intelligence forces in the Gaza Strip. “Many of us have been imprisoned by Hamas. 
Their oppressive measures are still ongoing,” remarks one Salafi Jihad fighter.4 
 
Their very presence and growing attraction highlights a pressure between the claim to 
‘moderate’5 nationalist Islamism epitomised by Hamas and the radical threat posed 
within Gaza by a new cohort of Islamists in their midst.  Hamas’s Islamist opponents are 
multi-faceted both in terms of ideology and operational reach and threat. They 
undermine the claims of Hamas’s Islamist governance agenda. In turn Hamas has 




In this article the challenge that is presented by new Islamist elements in the Gaza Strip 
to Hamas will be outlined. This challenge lies in the ideological certainties that in the 
West has led to the characterisation of Hamas as radical, terroristic and violent and 
incapable of transformation into a moderate political movement. In this respect Hamas, 
as its leaders often claim, is the ‘moderate’ face of Islamism far more palatable than the 
Jihadi ideologues and their armed followers represented by salafi-jihadi insurgence in 
the Gaza Strip and the conditions of siege that the Palestinian population lives under. 
“When compared to other religious parties,” warned Hamas leader Jamal Abu Hashem 
in January 2007, “[we] are a moderate movement ... I think US policy should not allow 
Hamas to go to or in the way of more radical parties in the region.”6 This moderate 
versus radical distinction, however, is largely unnoticed in the West though it 
preoccupies Islamists in the Middle East as they formulate localised responses to the 
Arab Spring and the decline of al-Qaeda.  
 
The emergence and actions of radical Islamists in the Gaza Strip reflect this localised 
response to the altered political dynamic of the region and Islamists claims within them. 
They reflect the extent to which opposition elements better capture a constituency of 
desperation than the governing authorities of Hamas. They are a manifestation of the 
transformation that has taken place in Gaza since the Hamas electoral victory of 
January 2006 and their takeover and ousting of Fatah in June 2007, the Israeli assault 
of 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead, the Siege and the events of the Arab Spring and 
Islamist renaissance of 2010-11 led by the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen movement.7  This 
transformation has been one where the Gaza Strip and constituencies of Islamism 
within it has experienced Western isolation and in response adopted a ‘Look East’ 
policy which emphasises ideological anti-Westernism, radicalism and jihadi discourses. 
The emergence of such groups takes place within a context of hopelessness, socio-
economic crisis, and dependency locally. Regionally Gazans have watched in awe as 
their Arab brothers and sisters have toppled hitherto powerful state elites and begun to 
vote into power Islamist political parties and leaders. Some have begun to question 
whether their Hamas rulers are capable of democratic Islamist leadership and 
representation in terms of their aspirations for conflict resolution and self-determination.  
Others believe that the Hamas leadership has failed in its duty to engage in jihad to 
overthrow a pernicious occupation which has blighted the Palestinian territories since 
1967. The latter tend to dwell among Hamas’s most vociferous and formidable Islamist 





In the late 1970s the Gaza Strip was the political preserve of Palestinian nationalists 
who were decidedly secular and leftist in orientation.8 Nascent Islamism had been firmly 
suppressed in the late 1950s and mid 1960s when Gaza fell under the same repressive 
measures as the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. President Nasser of Egypt threw 
Palestinian Islamists in jail and effectively closed them down. When Islamic dawa 
organisations were licensed by Israel as a foil to the secularists in the PLO they were 
largely considered a temporary nuisance of no real capacity or legitimacy. Dismissed as 
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a ‘here today gone tomorrow’ Islamist phenomenon the organizations that they founded 
nevertheless grew and won support for their clean credentials and ability to ideologically 
transform socio-economic discontent and nationalist longing into grievances that were 
manifested first at the Israeli ruling authorities and later at the Palestinian Authority 
dominated and controlled by the Fatah faction of the PLO. In many respects the 
emergence of the salafi and jihadi trend in Gaza has been treated by Hamas with the 
same degree of dismissal as their Fatah rivals treated them a generation earlier. They 
have both sought to play up (as a foil to their moderate claims) and play down (in terms 
of legitimacy challenges and security) the contentions that al-Qaeda and the salafi 
jihadis are present, active, supported and linked to regional networks of terror from the 
Gaza Strip.9 Hamas’s opponents have also claimed that since 2006 Gaza has been 
perceived as a place of opportunity for al-Qaeda and other jihadi-salafi groups. It has 
been contended that Palestine (and in this case the Gaza Strip) is a natural location for 
the jihadi ideology and agenda of al-Qaeda.   
 
The Palestinian issue enjoys a centrality10 among jihadi ideologues including Sayyid 
Qutb to Abduallah Azzam and Usama Bin Laden. 11 Palestine symbolises the pan-
Islamic and transcendent jihadi call that has defined such ideologues in their writings 
and their strategic agendas. Al-Qaeda has attempted to re-define part of its raison d’être 
as a call to arms for the Palestinians, demanding that Israel’s occupation be overthrown 
and that the territory it occupies be restored for perpetuity according to Islamic waqf. 
The slogan of the mujahedeen of Afghanistan in the 1980s that the road to Kabul led 
through Jerusalem has been repackaged by al-Qaeda in terms of a call to jihad in 
Palestine and Iraq as a duty (fard ayn) on Muslims and as part of anti-Western 
rhetoric.12 Hence it is contended that there is logic to taking the opportunity of physically 
locating and manifesting an al-Qaeda presence in such territories. The increased 
prominence of certain salafi-jihadi elements in Gaza that identify with al-Qaeda also 
promote the fear for Israel and its allies that security at its southern border will be further 
impacted by such a presence.13 This combines with strategic and security pressures 
that make Israel vulnerable on its northern border from a Hezbollah-Iranian axis and 
now to the south from new salafi-jihadi elements in addition to traditional concerns with 
Hamas. Hamas leaders and activists, however, have been prominent in denying that 
they sit as allies in the region with al-Qaeda or the other salafi jihadi elements that have 
emerged in Iraq, Yemen, the Maghreb and elsewhere. In fact Hamas has struggled to 
put ideological distance between itself and al-Qaeda and other salafi-jihadi elements. In 
part this is explicable by the political tightrope it has walked in terms of Islamist solidarity 
and populist appeal on the one hand and Israel’s propaganda efforts on the other. The 
populist appeal rests on a foundation of Islamism as a growing regional force capable of 
political transformation of which Hamas is variously part of or even a vanguard element 
to. But within this foundation of Islamism in the mode of force also lies terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda and their tactical resort to suicide bombings. As Reuter asserts, 
“however different their individual origins, programs, aims and politics are from each 
other, militant groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are united in their 
exploitation of suicide attacks to hit their enemies where they are most vulnerable.”14 
 




When Hamas won the elections of 2006 there were fears in Israel and other Western 
capitals that their control of the Palestinian Authority would also mean the establishment 
of greater Islamic authority in the region and an opportunity for al-Qaeda to locate itself 
in the area. In the wake of 9/11 Hamas leadership tried to avoid being perceived as part 
of al-Qaeda’s global jihad. Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, declared, a day 
after the attack, that it was not part of al-Qaeda and that Hamas had no intention of 
becoming part of the greater jihad of the salafi-jihadists, “We in Hamas: our battle is on 
the Palestinian land. We are not ready to move our battle out of the occupied 
Palestinian territories.”15 Sheikh Yassin, together with many other major Islamist leaders 
also signed a declaration of condemnation of the attacks of 9/11as “against all human 
and Islamic norms”.16Israel’s political leaders, however, underscored the similarities 
between Hamas and al-Qaeda, as jihadi firebrands, with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
informing US leaders that they faced their own Bin Laden like threat. Israel also warned 
against appeasing Islamists, “I call on the Western democracies, and primarily the 
leader of the free world, the United States: Do not repeat the dreadful mistake of 1938 
when enlightened European democracies decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a 
convenient temporary solution. Do not try to appease the Arabs at our expense ... Israel 
will fight terrorism.”17 For many in Israel it would only be a matter of time before al-
Qaeda was manifest among the Palestinians.18 Some US politicians also equated 
Palestinian organizations with al-Qaeda and alleged linkage to the 9/11 attacks through 
networks of terror. Others pointed out other motives for the purported linkage, “From 
what I know Israel has been using the Usama Bin Laden analogy to draw US support 
and they will probably do so more. But in reality I think the contacts are minimal”, 
commented an Israeli expert on terrorism.19 Recognising the difference in strategies 
between Hamas and al-Qaeda was problematic at a time when Hamas was defined by 
its infamous resort to suicide bombing attacks against Israeli targets. Ideological 
difference with respect to Hamas’s leadership combining political and militarised tactics 
as well as populist appeals and those of al-Qaeda that eschewed such approaches was 
lost on most audiences.  
 
Al Qaeda and Hamas, however, have recognised the differences between themselves. 
Hamas, in particular has ended up the target of al-Qaeda critique and attack. Al Qaeda 
and salafi-jihadis have excoriated the Hamas leadership and opposed them because of 
their political strategies and tactics of participation in the localised context of competition 
for control of the PA and sole leadership of the Palestinian issue. Here, as Yassin’s own 
words attest, the jihadi struggle is bounded by the localised and territorialized borders of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas had never taken its jihad beyond the borders of 
Israel and the Palestinian territories.20 Hamas, unlike al-Qaeda and the salafi-jihadis 
does not advocate the overthrow of jahilli regimes but like their counterparts in the 
Muslim Brotherhood call for change and reform (its election 2006 slogan) within 
societies and resistance against the occupation by Israel of Palestinian territory. 
Hamas’s earlier lexicon of jihad is today instead offered as resistance as part of a 
Palestinian national liberation movement. Al-Qaeda and the salafi jihadis have adopted 
a very different approach to jihad as global and transnational. The Hamas leadership 
has always promoted a gradualist approach – through policies of Islamization – to 
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societal and political change which in turn allows for tactics and strategies such as 
hudna (ceasefire) and (tahdiya) as well as participation in democratic secular processes 
such as elections to be practiced. Al-Qaeda and the jihadi-salafi reject and critique such 
approaches as capitulation to the erroneous policies and approaches of corrupted and 
jahilli regimes which in al-Qaeda’s view are condemned as kufr and apostate.  
 
In more recent years al-Qaeda’s leaders have publicly denounced Hamas’s action and 
approaches and thus have begun the inexorable categorization of the Hamas governing 
regime in Gaza and the wider Hamas movement as an anathema to them and the 
Islamist ideals that they represent. When Hamas announced in 2005 that it would 
participate in Palestinian municipal and legislative elections on the Change and Reform 
slate Al-Qaeda’s Deputy Ayman al Zawahiri attacked the decision and became a major 
critic of the movement. For such jihadis Hamas participation would do nothing to liberate 
“a grain of Palestinian land, but will choke the jihad,” and ultimately lead Hamas to 
failure in their commitment to usurp Israel through this Islamic duty. 21 In this respect al-
Qaeda contested Hamas legitimacy in the realm of governance and jihad against Israel 
and claimed it was faulted. When Hamas entered into a national unity government 
agreement with Fatah in February 2007 it again drew the ire of al Qaeda. But this time 
Hamas was vehement in responding to accusations against it, “Hamas did not forfeit its 
principles,” declared Sheikh Hamed Beitawi head of the Palestine Scholars Association. 
“We retain the right to resist the occupation – this is a right enshrined in faith and law.”22 
The issue is though whether the salafi-jihadi message championed by al-Qaeda has 
found appeal in the Gaza Strip amongst the very many hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees who sit poor and dispossessed by Israel’s occupation and the 
apparent indifference or double standards of the Western world.  
 
This has been the real challenge between Hamas and al-Qaeda and its salafi-jihadi 
opponents in the Gaza Strip: whose Islamist message resonates more strongly? Has al-
Qaeda’s oratory to the Palestinian people and about their issue translated into a 
growing appeal for the movement on the ground? Has the growing permeability of 
Gaza’s borders since the imposition of Israel’s siege (and the burgeoning of illegal 
tunnels from Egypt) and the ousting of Mubarak made Gaza a destination of choice for 
foreign jihadis who find a ‘welcome committee’ of local like-minded activists? Or has 
Gaza remained immune from the transnational global jihadist discourse of the past 
decade? Have Hamas and its PLO rivals been sufficient in suppressing nascent jihadi-
salafism in their midst to prevent such a phenomenon arising? Have the upstarts been 
defeated?  
 
Meeting the Challenge in Gaza  
 
It is claimed that Hamas, aided by Tehran on the one hand and a popular mandate on 
the other, had by June 2007, emerged as the singular most well-armed and organised 
group in the Sunni milieu as well as the Gaza Strip. Hamas had not only succeeded in 
defeating its enemies in Fatah at the ballot box but through command of its rapidly 
expanding armed forces and accompanying security infrastructure. It commanded a 
large popular movement as well as entered government to control the levers of power 
6 
 
within the Palestinian Authority.23 Hamas’s reputation for pragmatism and its strategic 
employment of violence contrasted with the maximalist and perceived limitless violence 
of al-Qaeda and the jihadi-salafi.  
 
Jihadi-Salafi allegedly arose amidst the chaos of internecine strife and bloodshed 
between Fatah and Hamas, and clans and families in Gaza 2006-2007. In part their 
voice became more prominent because al-Qaeda and other salafi-jihadis openly 
criticised Hamas for not only participating in the 2006 elections but its assumption of 
governing powers throughout the Gaza Strip. The assumption of governing powers 
grew some of the fiercest complaints because Hamas was perceived as failing to 
implement a strictly enforced government based on Shari ‘a. While Israel and its 
supporters lamented that Gaza under Hamas rule would devolve into an Islamic Emirate 
or ‘Hamastan’,24 others on the salafi-jihadi spectrum believed Hamas was not Islamic 
enough. The jihadi-salafi also emerged in a highly dangerous and lawless environment 
where the monopoly of force which the Palestinian Authority had potential to employ 
was simply not adequately realised.25 
 
The demands came in a changed political environment, one where in Gaza the worst 
nightmares of Israel, its allies and the Fatah faction of the PLO were being realised. 
Palestinian voters had turned their back on decades of corrupt and nepotistic Fatah 
rule, peace negotiations with Israel that failed to deliver peace and ever worsening 
(rather than improved) socio-economic conditions under continued Israeli occupation. 
Gazans had convinced themselves that they were empowered; Israel quit in the 
summer of 2005 (and Islamists claimed victory), they overturned Fatah control through 
the ballot box in both municipal and legislative elections but they elected an opposition 
group with no experience of governance to lead them. As Islamists Hamas drew the ire 
of its enemies and the fears of everyone as it plunged into violent attacks against its 
Palestinian counterparts. From this point the ‘red lines’ which many Palestinian said 
would never be crossed – in terms of Palestinian on Palestinian violence – were 
violated. Hamas, like Fatah, were ruthlessly determined to exercise power in Gaza. 
Hamas, as a governing power also had to deal with pragmatic politics both internally 
and in terms of Israel and pursuit of the resistance option through the firing of rockets. 
When Fatah had controlled Gaza Hamas had vociferously berated them for entering 
into ceasefire agreements with Israel that involved them actively policing against Hamas 
and other factions launching rockets from areas of northern Gaza. After 2007, however, 
the tables were turned on Hamas as it too announced unilateral “calms” (tahdiya) to 
prevent rocket fire from Gaza to Israel. Hence Hamas control came at a price in terms 
of populist Islamist messages about resistance and jihad. “We in Gaza live under the 
gun”, remarked a bearded former Hamas supporter in Shatti refugee camp, “we are 
under the control of the guns of Israel and Hamas. I am talking to you but if someone 
hears me saying these things I’ll be arrested ... in the past Hamas used to fire the 
rockets and called the PA collaborators for agreeing to tahdiya with Israel ... but now 
Hamas has accepted the hudna (ceasefire). Are we to blame them and tell them they 
are collaborators?”26  Hamas, aware of the accusations, defended themselves. “We are 
not throwing away our weapons or giving up resistance,” stated Hamas legislator Mushir 
al-Masri, “Hamas has not given up Palestinian rights and the difference between us and 
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Fatah on this is like the one between the earth and the sky ... They were deputies of the 
occupation ... Hamas will not cooperate with the occupation.”27 The rhetoric was strong 
but did not necessarily convince the intended audience.  
 
Increasingly Hamas’s Islamist agenda was also viewed as subject to its own sophistry 
while at the same time it has extended a monopoly of control of the Gaza Strip’s Islamic 
spaces. Mosques and tabligh wa dawa through extensive links into preaching and 
education have been placed under Hamas’s governmental monopoly and squeezed the 
religious space for other Islamist actors.28 Dissent focuses on such issues and the 
transformation which Hamas has undergone since it was elected to power in 2006. 
Dissenters within the salafi and jihadi fold focus on this power dynamic and its 
consequences either in terms of denouncing the political, “we believe Hamas is not 
going in the right direction of mixing politics with religion,” or its localised rather than 
global jihad agenda in resisting Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, “to us what they 
call violence is resistance. We will act in any direction that spites the Israeli 
occupation.”29 Hamas’s Islamist opponents are hence represented in the traditional 
salafi of Gaza as well as the newly emergent salafi-jihadis, some of whom claim 
allegiance to and support of al-Qaeda. Alongside remains the Islamic Jihad faction 
whose leader in exile remains Ramadan Shallah and elements of the Hizbt Tahrir.  
 
 
Fundamentalist: Traditional salafists 
‘Will the sons of Jihad Salafi who accused Hamas of apostasy apologise now?’30 
 
Since the late 1970s Islamic fundamentalist inspired groups have been based in the 
Gaza Strip and included what are commonly referred to as the traditional salafists. The 
main locales for such elements have been Rafah and Khan Younis. They have a 
presence which casts a powerful Islamist influence over society. They are also accused 
of attacking shops and businesses engaged in practices considered ‘un-Islamic’. In this 
respect they can be considered to be an indigenous manifestation of contemporary 
Islamism in the Palestinian territories rather than an al-Qaeda like import. Salafi groups 
are, as the quote above highlights, perceived as hostile to Hamas. Some Hamas 
leaders consider them supporters of the opposition Fatah faction because of their fealty 
to the established governing power. The traditional salafists have always sought to 
address themselves to the Palestinian issue. “We began calling for a salafi curriculum ... 
sermons, lessons and direct contact with the people ... we do not refer to ourselves as a 
party or a movement,” claims leading salafi cleric Sheikh Yassin al-Astal.31 Traditional 
salafi elements always eschewed political participation maintaining a powerful profile in 
society through its preaching and propagation activity including those encouraging 
virtue and prohibiting vice.  
By 2007, however, some traditional salafi elements came to prominence as a result of a 
number of incidents and issues attributed to them. Such incidents include threats and 
subsequent attack on an UNRWA school in Rafah during a graduation ceremony 
because, it was alleged, it was not gender segregated and allowed for the “mixing of the 
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sexes”. In this case, on 6 May 2007 a Salafi group held a demonstration at the school 
and in subsequent events a shooting incident took place.  The gun and homemade 
bomb attack on the UNRWA school began with a protest by the Salafi who said the 
event was un-Islamic. One protester's sign said the U.N. "is turning schools into 
nightclubs." Protesters also accused an UNRWA official in Gaza, who was in the school, 
of leading a movement to weaken people's Islamic faith. The group of protesters tried to 
enter the school and Palestinian security officers fired in the air to keep them away. In 
the ensuing chaos, at least one homemade bomb was thrown into the school. A gun 
battle followed.32 The attack in Rafah appeared to be carried out by the same Salafi 
elements behind a string of bombings of Internet cafes and pool halls in Gaza, claimed 
Palestinians. There were also fears at the time that such elements had perpetrated 
attacks on men and women accused by the group of so-called ‘moral crimes’. They are 
also referred to as the ‘Mujahedeen of Rafah’ and have been accused on mounting 
attacks on the Rafah crossing area in order to provoke some form of Israeli incursion.33  
Salafi leaders outlined the following views. These views represent some of the apparent 
contradictions inherent between the thought and practice of Palestinian Salafi elements, 
including their views on leadership, authority, and confrontation. “Salafi follow the ways 
of Prophet Mohammad and Salafi have all the respect for the ruler. They are realistic: 
Israel is a reality and Palestinians are incapable of waging a war,” said one leader.34 
Salafi elements revere authority in a traditional Sunni fashion – to the extent that they 
will tolerate authoritarianism to avoid chaos (fitna). This is why some Hamas leaders 
dismiss such elements as “Fatah supporters”. Some Salafi leaders concur with such a 
view, “We consider Abu Mazen our leader and of Palestinian society. We will never rise 
against him. We don’t have Hamas members in our group like the jihadi salafists. We 
are transparent and known to the whole community as dawa.”35 As one leader asserts 
“salafi are implementing the call of the Prophets. President Abbas is a Muslim and a 
respected leader as long as he has not demonstrated any heretical behaviour.” 
Returning Palestinian society to the ‘straight path of Islam’ is the key framework from 
which the Salafi operate: “a ruler is the one in charge of changing the situation of the 
people. The Palestinian President is the one responsible for his people and for his 
nation …”36  
By late 2007 some traditional salafi leaders barely concealed their antipathies towards 
Hamas for its takeover over the Gaza Strip from Fatah. “The coup in Gaza has nothing 
to do with religious beliefs. Killing people in the name of God is a crime.  Hamas is a 
political party with a military wing, that lacks comprehensive understanding … It took 
Islam as a cover for its actions … It is a political party that has achieved only on the 
social level … It should have never gotten to the Authority because it is not ready for 
such a role …   It should recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
people..   True Islam bans inter-fighting (fitna)… and the Salafi criticize the criminal acts 
of Hamas in Gaza.”37 Here the traditional salafi began to echo or reflect a similar 
Islamist antipathy to al-Qaeda in its ‘principled’ opposition to the Hamas takeover as 
well. Moreover the ‘spiritual’ leaders of the traditional salafi elements stated that they 
disdained violence or armed attacks unless permitted for the following 3 reasons: ‘In 
Islam … you are allowed to kill in three cases: 1. In punishment for crimes committed by 
citizens and in this case only the ruler can carry out this punishment, 2. to punish those 
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individuals who commit adultery, 3. to punish a Muslim who converts from Islam to 
another belief. No civilian should take the responsibility of punishing others.  Hence 
Hamas in [our] view has committed crimes through its coup in Gaza.”  
The leaders said they opposed inter-factional fighting to avoid (chaos) fitna. “What 
happened in Gaza is a crime because people were killed in the name of 
God.”  Traditional salafists also warned that the political path pursued by Hamas would 
dilute its Islamist credentials, “the goal was to get the Islamists to follow the secular 
Fatah's approval of the international resolutions on Palestine. All those resolutions 
recognized the Israeli entity in Palestine, and so, the Palestinian state is limited to the 
part that has been occupied in1967. All the Palestinian factions accepted that proposal 
except for Islamic Jihad and the PFLP, who refused it partially.” 38 Hence for traditional 
salafi Hamas had crossed the Rubicon in accepting – through political participation – a 
non-Islamist solution to the conflict with Israel.   
From 2007 onwards the traditional salafi of Gaza grew in appeal and support but their 
armed elements remained clandestine for fear of reprisal from Israel and Hamas. The 
leadership of traditional salafi eschew any link or relation with al-Qaeda.  “The Takfiris 
and the Jihadis are a minority in the Salafi,” stated one leader. Moreover the leadership 
acknowledged that they sent their “shebab” to “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in order to 
distance them from the Takfiri trend. These trips and courses in religious belief are 
funded by rich scholars from among the Salafi Movement in Saudi Arabia.” Indeed 
historically the traditional salafi leadership and its followers in the Gaza Strip have 
followed Saudi inspired wahabbi salafi principles and likewise have echoed the Saudi 
regimes repudiation of al-Qaeda.   
Some traditional salafi clearly remain opposed to Hamas who they claim ignore the 
spiritual aspects of society. Fatah is not seen by such leaders as a threat in the way that 
Hamas is. It is dismissed as, “neither ideological in nature nor spiritual. They have 
Communists and Christians under their umbrella.”  Sheikh Sa’ad Sharaf a leader in the 
Sufi trend in the West Bank contended though that, salafi were supporting Fatah against 
Hamas because “they want to spread their thought in order to dominate mosques … 
they use Fatah to reach their religious goals.  The relationship [between] Fatah and 
salafi are only to serve mutual interests. Fatah does not have any religious dimension… 
just a national one… hence it serves Fatah to have the Salafi talk religion in their 
name.” 39 To what extent these words are prophesy is difficult to measure. Firstly such 
statements demonstrate further the innate rivalry between the various elements (armed 
and unarmed) of the Palestinian Islamic movement and potential for confrontation and 
conflict. Furthermore one might argue that Fatah’s policy of encouraging the salafi as a 
religious foil to Hamas was potentially dangerous. Many in the Sufi movement support 
and back the PA also as a foil to Hamas and the salafi. They claim that “Hamas has 
banned Sufis from talking  in the name of religion … On the other hand , Sufism,  wants 
to work for  Fatah, which does not have any religious dimension in order to combat 
Hamas whose thoughts coincide with the  salafi thought.”40 The traditional salafi remain 
a potential threat to Hamas governance of Gaza with respect to the ‘Islamization’ of 
Palestinian society – they are prepared to use force of arms to ensure “compliance” 
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from the local community in Gaza and this is a challenge to Hamas’s much vaunted law 
and order agenda which it monopolizes.  Hence the traditional salafists continue to 
promote Islamization based on fundamentalist strictures regarding piety and the 
organization of society. They maintain a grassroots presence, concentrated in particular 
areas, throughout the Gaza Strip which remains an inherent challenge to Hamas and its 
own Islamization agenda. 
 
Jaljalat and the Jihadi phenomenon  
 
The jihadi phenomenon in Gaza is not new. In the late 1970s and early 1980s as 
Islamic resurgence transformed the Middle East, in Gaza, as in other locations there 
arose ideologues and nascent groups tied to the jihadi agenda inspired by radical 
thinkers.41 These groups distinguished themselves from Hamas for a variety of reasons 
including ideological. The vanguardist and oppositional nature of Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) brought it into tension and occasional conflict with Hamas – particularly with 
respect to resistance against Israel versus the promotion of populist Islamization 
agendas. Hence the Islamist spectrum in the Gaza Strip has always contained a radical 
element that has contrasted with the reformist and conservative ideas and approaches 
of Hamas and religious elements within the Fatah organization.  
 
The innovation of the salafi-jihadi newcomers perhaps lies with respect to their embrace 
of global jihadism and its application to the Palestinian context. To a certain extent this 
inverts the jihadi thinking of PIJ and yet unifies ranks in terms of opposing Hamas’s 
stance in government. The context in which these groups have arisen reflects this 
ongoing power struggle within the Palestinian milieu and incorporates the debilitating 
state of divide which emerged between Fatah and Hamas after January 2006. The new 
salafi-jihadis emerged, cell-like and small in number, armed and connected to powerful 
local clan and family networks amidst this contest of power and lawlessness of Gaza 
during this period.  
 
They include groups such as Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of God’s Compassion), Jaysh 
al-Islam (Army of Islam), “Jaysh Tawheed wa Jihad (Army of Unity and Jihad), the 
Doghmush family groups, Jund Allah (God’s Soldiers) Popular Resistance Committee 
[elements] and Jaysh Arafat as-Sunnah and Jaysh Ansar as-Sunnah.”42 Both Hamas 
and Israel refer to the groups collectively as Jaljalat (Rolling Thunder). They are also 
commonly referred to in Gaza as the “young zealots”. The most prominent of these 
groups is Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of God’s Compassion); Jaysh Al-Islam (Army of 
Islam); and Jaysh Tawheed wa Jihad (Army of Unity and Jihad). The groups are 
amorphous, dynamic and can disappear as quickly as they rise up.  
Such groups are allegedly responsible for the organization of attacks against Israel 
including rocket attacks, attempted kidnappings and assassinations, hostage taking of 
foreigners including journalists, NGO workers and activists. Internally they have 
organised strikes and raids and attacks on local businesses and individuals in Gaza 
who they consider engaged in immoral or apostate activities, such as internet cafe 
owners, video shops, cafes where men and women formerly used to socialise, 
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pharmacists and males working in women’s hair salons. As one internet cafe owner 
recounted, “The Jaysh Al-Islam attacked my shop and trashed the place ... according to 
the Government [Hamas] they know these elements but I am afraid to file a complaint ... 
this is a totalitarian society we live in and Hamas won’t dare stop those guys who 
declare they act in the name of Islam.”43 The groups, as the internet cafe owner 
highlights, represent a threat to the Hamas government and its monopoly of force within 
Gaza and in deciding how to pursue the resistance against Israel. Unlike Fatah and the 
leftist PLO faction which Hamas could outbid in terms of Islamic symbolism, the new 
groups claim to be the fundamentalist and true Islamist alternative, “We deal with a pure 
and undiluted Islam”, states one salafi-jihadi leader. The ideology that these groups 
claim to represent has challenged the legitimacy of Hamas in terms of the wider Islamist 
project, its orientation and strategies for achieving common goals. 
Jund Ansar Allah has emerged as a prominent challenger to Hamas’s legitimacy claims. 
They echo al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri in critiquing Hamas for its ceasefire agreements with 
Israel and its ‘policing’ to prevent other factions from launching attacks on Israel. The 
group has launched its own attacks against Israeli and Palestinian targets. Propaganda 
on its websites and through the local distribution of communiqués in Gaza has focussed 
on berating the Hamas government and its local security forces for constraining and 
restricting its activities and failing to implement Shari ‘a law under their rule.44 The 
challenge to Hamas came to a head in August 2009 in the southern city of Rafah where 
the group’s leader Abdel-Latif Mousa and his followers made a unilateral declaration of 
Islamic Statehood. As Mousa preached to the congregation in the somewhat appositely 
named Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah Hamas dispatched security forces to put the 
putsch against them down. Hamas security forces killed Mousa and 11 others, and 
organised an arrest campaign to eradicate the group. Despite the claims that the group 
“essentially ceased to exist” in the wake of 2009 its leader in December 2011 
contradicted its demise and claimed that the group was active and “To us ideology and 
blood are one and the same thing. Our leader Abdel Latif Mousa, who was killed in 
Rafah by Hamas, continues to be our guide and leader. We are still present and 
active.”45 
 Jaysh Al-Islam, although formerly aligned to Hamas, and believed to be part of the 
elements that kidnapped BBC journalist Alan Johnston and Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, 
are part of the Jaljalat umbrella in terms of both embracing al-Qaeda like jihadi 
approaches as well as opposing Hamas. They first came to public attention in Gaza in 
May 2006. They declared, in a widely distributed communiqué that:   
We are not waging jihad for the sake of [recovering] a plot of land, illusory frontiers or 
nationalism ... Our jihad is much loftier, … This religion will not be able to triumph 
through a generation made rotten by [earthly] pleasures or broken by the security 
services of tyrannical governments … Our jihad is based on a solid foundation and aims 
to end occupation and tyranny as a prelude to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate 
…46  
Israeli intelligence sources at the time asserted that the group was part of or linked to al-
Qaeda. In Gaza many other local security and intelligence sources asserted to that the 
group was not linked to al-Qaeda but was a “front for elements using the label of Islam 
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to conduct their business.”47 It was a poorly concealed secret that certain elements of 
the Doghmush family were prominent within the Army of Islam.48  
In 2007 the Army of Islam kidnapped the BBC correspondent Alan Johnston. On June 
25, 2007 a video was released by Army of Islam showing Johnston with an explosive 
belt around his waist, with a demand for the release of Muslim prisoner and global 
jihadist leader Abu Qatada from British custody. On July 4, 2007, after Hamas arrested 
several members of Army of Islam including its spokesman, Alan Johnston was handed 
over to Hamas and released. The Army of Islam, however, is perceived as still 
representing a threat to Israel and may have sought, in the wake of its fall-out with 
Hamas, to strengthen ties with external radical Islamist elements such as al-Qaeda 
affiliates. Hamas, however, are unlikely to truly tolerate the manifestation of such a 
group for much longer. It has already succeeded in forging further disarmament deals 
which go some way to dissipating the group and the family behind it. Yet by the winter 
of 2011 the group was still functioning, its operatives killed by Israel and it was believed 
to be behind rocket launches to Israel’s southern cities. Egyptian officials blamed the 
group for suicide bomb attacks against churches in Alexandria and in May 2011 the US 
government designated it a foreign terrorist organization.49  
Many analysts are agreed that the salafi-jihadi elements represented by Jaljalat do not 
represent a significant threat to Hamas’s monopoly of force as governing power in 
Gaza. The ideological challenge it does pose, however, reflects the changes within 
Islamism in the Middle East since the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the declining 
fortunes of al-Qaeda and western responses. As more and more elements of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, accede to power and governance, they will face the same 
challenges that Hamas does from its internal Islamist critiques. In Gaza this internal 
critique is emphasised with respect to Israel’s continued siege of Gaza and official 
international isolationism. It is ameliorated in part by the ‘opening’ up of Gaza to Egypt 
in the wake of Mubarak’s ousting. But it has also made Gaza and the Hamas authorities 
vulnerable to salafi-jihadi ambitions and access externally as well as internally. There is 
an attraction to the message of the salafi-jihadis among Gaza’s young population, 
disaffected Hamas members who reside on the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, as 
well as isolated or marginalised former militants from other Palestinian factions. As 
demonstrated the salafi, salafi-jihadis can also count of powerful family and clan 
networks and particular geographic districts of the Gaza Strip where Hamas’s reach is 
weaker than it would like.  
  
The Phantom of global jihad  
 
“Al-Qaeda is coming whether Hamas like it or not! 
  
Hamas, as this article has demonstrated, has historically demonstrated an intrinsic 
interest in preventing any manifestation of al-Qaeda in the Gaza Strip or attempts to 
conflate its programme with those of salafi-jihadis engaged in a global war on apostate 
regimes in the region and the West. To do this it must repress manifestations of radical 
Islamism in its midst. Thus even though al-Qaeda has not succeeded in gaining a 
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foothold in Gaza the vigilance of Hamas extends to the policing of those local Islamist 
elements that embrace the agenda, goals or aspirations of the al-Qaeda network. 
Jihadi-salafi, aware of Hamas’s fear, draws on such sources as a form of developing a 
challenge and threat to Hamas’s power. Leaders of the salafi-jihadi groups 
acknowledge the influence of important jihadi ideologues including traditionalists such 
as Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayyid Qutb, Azzam Abduallah Azzam, Ayman Zawahiri and Abu 
Mohammed al-Maqdissi. “Each knows the important and urgency of the jihad and its 
message for the followers of Islam”, claims one salafi-jihadi. Indeed the Army of Islam, 
while holding kidnapped  journalist Alan Johnston along with demanding the release of 
Abu Qatada from british custody also called for the release of al-Maqdissi from a 
Jordanian prison. Maqdissi appears with other well-known salafi-jihadi scholars to urge 
support for their brother’s in Gaza on their websites and propaganda.50 Hamas’s secular 
Palestinian national opponents in Fatah including Palestinian President Abbas also 
accuse them of failing to prevent al-Qaeda infiltration into the Gaza Strip. The President 
and his Fatah followers were ousted from Gaza in a humiliating takeover by Hamas. In 
the proceeding war of words Fatah leaders regularly accuse Hamas of allowing al-
Qaeda into Gaza or of supporting it. “What did they do when Bin Laden was killed?” 
asked a Fatah Executive Committee member. “Haniyeh went on TV and said ‘We 
condemn the murder of this Arab and Muslim Holy warrior.”51 Fears of al-Qaeda 
infiltration have increased since the collapse of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and the 
deterioration of security coordination between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai. Hamas 
continues to deny all speculation of an al-Qaeda presence and attacks on Israel 





There is no doubt that Gaza’s Islamist environment is proliferating. The successes of 
fellow Muslim Brother and Salafi Islamists in neighbouring Egypt is an encouragement 
both to Hamas and its local jihadi-salafi rivals. Their successes are not merely about the 
dividend of participating in elections and achieving power but the wider Islamist milieu 
which has emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. This is better news for Hamas and 
its links to the Muslim Brotherhood than the jihadi salafists of Gaza who have seen 
declining currency of the message of al-Qaeda. Such circumstances may embolden 
Hamas to engage in further repressive policies against its Islamists opponents. Its 
leaders, unlike the Ikhwan of Egypt, are not presently inclined into pacts or power-
sharing arrangements with salafi, jihadis, or a combination of the both. Traditional 
salafists are described by Hamas leaders such as Yahya Mousa as “Fatah supporters” 
and dismissed for any potential to challenge the Islamist hegemony of power the Hamas 
has become in Gaza.53 Salafi-jihadists are similarly regarded and dismissed – as weak 
in numbers and too diffuse to present a serious challenge. Such charges are strongly 
refuted, “Jaysh al Ummah Tawhid wa Jihad, the Doghmush groups, Popular Resistance 
Committees groups are all our allies. Others like Jaysh Arafat as-Sunnah and Jaysh 
Ansar as-Sunnah cooperate with us as well ..., states one jihadi leader in Gaza.  
“Numbers are not important because we are respected and felt in this religious 
atmosphere that is tainted with poverty and siege.”54 Other jihadists, including 
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Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are still regarded as nothing other than an excuse for some 
Hamas leaders to demonstrate the movement’s tolerance. “They are living in the field of 
thoughts,” asserts Mahmoud Zahar55. Hamas deputy Prime Minister Dr Awad contends 
further that dealing with the salafists is a very different challenge than dealing with other 
Islamists, “they are organizationally weak – they are just capitalising on the immediate 
reality and will not necessarily endure ...”56 Such comments point to the frustration 
which the jihadis, salafi and jihadi-salafi express and represent in terms of Gaza’s wider 
population. They are critical, where many others fear to be because of repression, are 
Hamas’ style of governing, and its strategic position in terms of issues such as the 
negotiation with Israel of the prisoner release in return for Gilad Shalit, the pursuit of 
National Reconciliation with Fatah to end the State of Divide, and the ceasefire with 
Israel concluded during Operation Cast Lead in January 2009. While Hamas may 
believe it has been successful simply by enduring in power and governing Gaza since 
2007 its Islamist critiques see the movement as a capitulator, of renegotiating the 
principle of resistance through sophistry that betrays the Palestinian cause and leave 
Gaza’s population under Siege from Israel and boycott by most western states.  
They, like Hamas, interpret a lot from the events that have shaken the wider region 
since December 2010. They see opportunity, should they wish to take it in a salafi 
political path (as Salafists in Egypt have done). At present Salafi-Jihadi leaders are 
content to approve of events in Egypt rather than propose the same route for 
themselves. “We were very pleased when the salafi won in Egypt ... But I don’t think 
that we want to engage in elections ourselves. We don’t believe in elections as they are 
destructive for Hamas and we don’t recognise Fatah. We will not engage. We will 
always continue our resistance and we do not recognise the hudna,” asserts one rising 
star of a Gaza-based group.”57 Their grievances against the Hamas authorities remain, 
particularly with respect to what they see as their right to pursue armed resistance 
(jihad) against Israel and the imprisonment by Hamas of some of their leaders. They 
complain of having to act and live like “wanted men” in a society purportedly of Muslim 
hue and pretention. Their discontent, when tied to grievances about poverty, and lack of 
political progress in the conflict with Israel, finds growing support – not only among 
defectors from Hamas’s armed wing of the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades but among the 
many young Gazans who chafe at Hamas’s institutionalization and the opportunities for 
clientalism that have arisen. Hamas’s hegemonic Islamist claims are being challenged 
internally and encouraged as its counterparts in Egypt in the Muslim Brotherhood find 
themselves in a similar predicament following the opening of the political process to a 
diverse array of political forces including a multiplicity of Islamists. The challenge for 
Hamas, like other political actors, is how to manage the ‘other’ Islamists who are 
unwilling to serve under them.  
The salafi, jihadis and salafi-jihadis represent pocket-like constituencies in the Gaza 
Strip but their Islamists claims, like those of their Hamas rivals, address wider concerns 
which address the Palestinian predicament and conflict with Israel. These concerns lay 
with the direction of resistance (which Hamas has altered), the issue of a continuing 
jihad, recognition of Israel, Palestinian internal reconciliation issues, democracy and 
elections, Islamism in the wake of the Arab Spring and the changed power-balances in 
the wider Middle East region. In this respect the fundamental potency of the Islamist 
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opponents of Hamas lies in the overlie between their specific ideological perspective 
and the conditions under which ordinary Gazans lives. It is within the ideology of global 
jihadism that a constructed sense of Palestinian empowerment can be generated at a 
time when other Palestinian political perspectives point to emasculation. The ideas find 
tangible expression in attacks on Israel and threats against the Hamas government for 
its poor performance in transforming the political system to the dictates of Islam. The 
challenge, at present is albeit limited. Much to their chagrin, Hamas has continued to 
contain and repress their Islamist opponents, “many of us have been imprisoned by 
Hamas. Their oppressive measures are ongoing,” states one Jaljalat jihadi leader in 
Gaza.58 Yet it is unlikely that this Islamist opposition will wither away and in the current 
regional climate of resurgent Islamism including the salafi and salafi-jihadi variety the 
political criticism they lay at Hamas’s door cannot be ignored.   
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